Nixon Was A Crook, So What?

Throughout my formative school years, one of the gospels of American history repeated ad nauseam, enforced by the glittering legend of two brave reporters and the villainy of multiple arrests, lawsuits, shocking audiotape recordings and stunning accusations, was that Richard Nixon was a bastard tyrant, one of the worst presidents in US history.

At 23 years old, I can finally assert with vigor and conviction: “So what?”.

Is it right for the national narrative to be obsessed with his crimes (aside from a polite nod to the opening of Communist China)?  Does this do the nation much benefit besides an emotional feel-good story about “never being fooled again”?

I have come to appreciate Nixon’s legacy in foreign policy, accepting the grisly compromises and deals made in places like Chile and Cambodia because the thought process that led him and Kissinger to such decisions was mostly supported by the facts reasonably apparent to careful observers at the time and now decades later.  His domestic policies (prominently civil rights, environmental issues and the scope and shape of the US government) should be viewed as a blueprint for how a partisan president in the future can lead effectively and wisely.  Excesses certainly occurred, crimes committed and lies dubiously maintained, but given the near constant stream of corruption and malfeasance evident in presidential administrations of a varying sort Nixon is largely on par with his predecessors and successors.

Beyond searching for what passes for the truth and reality in the often shadowy, confusing chain of events in the national security era, it has become possible for me to learn from the writings and ideas set forth by Nixon while in office and in his memoirs and policy blueprint books.  In much the same way most Americans find inspiration and meaning in the words and deeds of Kennedy, Truman, Eisenhower, Reagan and FDR (not to mention the Founding Fathers, Lincoln, TR, etc), I place a paramount value on Nixon’s perceptive understanding of America’s role and long-term interest.

Where does one start?  Nixon’s “In The Arena” makes for profound reading at times, particularly in his wise cleaving of the realistic goal of promoting and spreading freedom (a personal belief) from the Utopian vision of spreading democracy (a system that does not guarantee good governance nor holds natural or historical roots in most cultures).  Nixon understood freedom was a “personal condition that can survive in political systems other than democracies” and thus would be easier promoted among peoples, cultures and nations, rather than “imposing our system on nations that have neither the traditions nor the institutions to make democracy work”.

“Idealism without pragmatism is impotent.  Pragmatism without idealism is meaningless.”  An observation readily applied to the debacle that is American foreign policy at this moment, where naive beliefs in democracy for all in the Middle East have given way to a cynical view that discounts the input of people on the ground along their needs, traditions and perceptions.  Nixon’s “pragmatic idealism” found him moving beyond policy dogma and understanding the opportunities apparent in winning China’s partnership.  A future president should one day view similar dogmas like that of “Iran and America have nothing in common” (ditto for Cuba and the dozen or so breeds of Islamists who hold power or have serious influence across the MENA and Africa) and transcend them via a hard-headed examination of the future combined with a soft-hearted view of compromise and short-term loss.

Nixon noted Pakistani Pres. Ayub Khan once told him its “dangerous to be America’s friend, pays to be neutral and sometimes helps to be an enemy”.  Developments have proven this to still be true, where terrorists strike allies like Spain and Britain, ideological enemies like Hugo Chavez threaten neighboring institutions in countries in Latin America and America makes severe strategic and moral concessions in order to keep oil flowing from sources in Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Angola.   Placing greater emphasis on military means and Utopian rhetoric instead of a serious struggle of ideas and visions, America has ignored Nixon’s understanding of the power of ideas that are “truly enduring…….(and) have always been grounded in cultural traditions and institutions, thereby tapping the strength of history”.  Such a struggle if ever waged by a future administration would likely find more allies abroad with more common ground on which to stand on.

What A Wonderful World

I owe a tremendous apology to the artist who left the greatest impression upon me (he died on 11 Dec. 1964, with nary a peep from this blog commerating his death and many contributions to modern music).  Rather hilarious that I first learned of him from a Chinese Muslim boat captain in Hong Kong 2 1/2 years ago.

Lt. Gen Mattis For PACOM

Admiral Fallon’s departure from PACOM (US Pacific Command) to take the reigns at CENTCOM (US Central Command) leaves a profound gap in American leadership and vision in Asia.  In PACOM territory, Admiral Fallon personified the constantly evolving US strategy for dealing with nations and trends that are and will continue to be of growing importance to American interests, joining a select group of visionary officials (such as Treasury Secy. Henry Paulson) who hold such forward thinking.  Since 2005, as Washington D.C. proved incapable of adequately advancing US interests in the region because of its obsession with Iraq and counter-terrorism, Admiral Fallon stepped into the breach and engaged US allies in revamping existing relationships (particularly Japan and India but certainly not ignoring Indonesia or the Philippines) while laying the groundwork for closer cooperation with China.  

Background Aside: Admiral Fallon took a lot of grief from elements within the Pentagon (i.e. the military-industrial complex folks who dream of China as the next big peer competitor for America in order to justify ever more extravagant and largely useless defense systems). Thomas PM Barnett who is a strong advocate of a closer US-China relationship, highlighted Admiral Fallon’s “maverick” status here.

It is doubtful that America’s lack of a comprehensive Asia policy will change any time soon.  Thus the replacement for Admiral Fallon at PACOM must be considered not only the face of the US military in Asia, but the face of the USG to Asian governments and important NGO’s, as Fallon often was.  The positive momentum Admiral Fallon generated in areas like mil-mil relationships, counterterrorism and strategic development should not be wasted, nor should the common ground he engaged nations upon be ignored.  The only candidate who could possibly match or even exceed Admiral Fallon’s accomplishments is Lt. Gen James Mattis, currently the head of I Marine Expeditionary Force. 

Why Lt. Gen Mattis?

• He has extensive experience in stabilization operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and is one of the finest minds in the world with a handle on what it takes to make and break nations.  Considering the failed states (North Korea, Burma, Sri Lanka, etc.) that could become hot spots in the next few years, this could prove vital.  The potential natural disasters that could overwhelm the response capacities of nations from Thailand to India also inform the need for his kind of experience and intelligence.
• His experiences with counterinsurgency would bode well to advance US military and diplomatic relationships with India, Indonesia and the Philippines.  All three are engaged in a variety of “small wars” the US would do well to learn from, as well as providing potential testing labs for the COIN ideas advanced by Lt. Gen Mattis, Lt. Gen Petraeus and Australian Lt. Col Kilcullen in more forgiving environments than the sectarian civil war in Iraq.
• He would have the real world credentials and political courage (in an era of harmful obsession with force protection) to advance the “dirt sailor” concept currently championed by the CNO, Admiral Michael Mullen.  Deploying specially trained teams of sailors to lend a humanitarian and development hand in places like Aceh, East Timor, the Solomon Islands and Bangladesh would help further relations with host nations and bolster the US image and reputation during a time of serious decline.   The success of the hospital ship USNS Mercy should also not be taken lightly.
• At a time of North Korean nuclear brinkmanship, his extensive combat experience should not be discounted should Kim Jong Il or his replacements decide to start a war.
• His “no better friend, no worse enemy” motto for Marines fits PACOM’s mission well;  for potential enemies who would harm PACOM forces, for allies and new friends, and for military personnel who run afoul of military and local laws, misbehavior which impedes US progress and interests. 
• Lt. Gen. Mattis would almost certainly recognize the great potential for officer and NCO exchanges within PACOM, especially with the glut of junior Naval officers who could be utilized to expand and deepen US relations with China, Malaysia, Indonesia, Mongolia, Bangladesh and others.
• Lastly, his appointment would help soothe ruffled feathers in the inter-service rivalries that still exist, with the Navy “taking” over CENTCOM (a traditional Army or Marine Corps post), why shouldn’t the Marines “take” over PACOM (traditionally Navy)?

Lt. Gen James Mattis understands the dynamics of geopolitics and international security like few others.  Many of his ideas represent the likely future direction of the US military and USG, much as the nations within PACOM’s sphere represent where many of America’s future interests and friendships are.  PACOM is the land of opportunity to be seized now and in the future, and Lt. Gen Mattis would be the most likely commander to recognize this clearly and act upon it.