Tony Corn’s Seaborne Great Game And The 1,000 Ship Navy

Tony Corn has unveiled yet another piece of work that demands one’s attention by capably encompassing a wide array of subjects from lawfare at the UN to the Caspian energy mirage.

(Really, after 3 in a row in less than 2 years, perhaps he should consider at least a modest pamphlet style release of the prior essays along with one or two more).

“The Revolution In Transatlantic Affairs” in the Hoover Institution’s Policy Review.

Most notably he spends a considerable bit of space on the increasing value of sea power, from here on to be declared the “seaborne Great Game”. Here follows a short discussion of the main highlights on maritime issues Corn skillfully covers.

Nationalism may be dwindling elsewhere, but its alive and well at sea.

“The belated implementation, in the 1990s, of the 1982 Law of the Sea (UNLOS) and in particular of the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), has had over time unintended effects. Due to the existence of more than one hundred EEZs, 32 percent of the ocean is today under some sort of national jurisdiction. We are talking an area of 28 million square miles, i.e. four times the size of Russia (America’s EEZ itself is two-thirds the size of the continental United States and accounts for 30 percent of the U.S. oil production). The process of territorialization of the seas has been twofold: the “enlarging” of territorial waters from 12 miles to 200 miles, but also the deepening of territorialization”.

Further:

“…it is worth keeping in mind that more than 30 percent of the world’s oil and 50 percent of the world’s natural gas is produced offshore. The percentage is greater still when moving from proven reserves (i.e., 90 percent certainty) to probable reserves (50 percent certainty). Add to that the fact that 60 percent of the world’s oil and gas is transported by sea, and in the end, it is hard to deny that command of the high seas will matter just as much as control of the Heartland.”

Corn sees a striking historic irony:

“A little-noticed global chasm is occurring today in terms of geopolitics. As the center of gravity of world history is shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific, the Western mind, traditionally maritime, is rapidly closing itself to anything other than conventional matters, while the Asian mind, traditionally continental, is becoming increasingly maritime in outlook.”

In an era where America’s shipbuilders are busy under serving the maritime services and the taxpayer, when attention is focused in most quarters on how a better “major war” army can be rebuilt or a counter-insurgent, expeditionary force can be formed out of the ashes of Iraq and Afghanistan and when the Navy is occasionally in an intellectual lockjaw that is stuck on the dangers of China’s great power aspirations, this does not bode well.

In Asia, “the lack of clarity of the law of the sea regarding such issues as military and intelligence-gathering activities in the EEZs of other countries, and the competing claims for territorial waters and seabeds, has become a game increasingly fraught with dangers.”

Corn seems to write this in building up to the dangers of emerging powers (China) and alternative security structures (the Shanghai Cooperation Organization SCO), but one can imagine a second track, where if America were to embark on a more sane and sustainable policy and strategy course, the importance of the American Navy getting its act together in defining its role in the new seaborne Great Game as a trust broker between competing power blocs or nations at sea could be useful.

“NATO is today paying less attention to potential maritime threats affecting its own civilian populations than to making the non-Western world safe for democracy (or sharia, since the jury is still out). If NATO wants to survive another 30 years, it will have to focus a little more on the concerns of its own population.”

Tying what he declares the “Seaborne Great Game” with the “Long War”, Corn praises the naval community for understanding the transnational dimension of terrorist networks, contrasting them with the “NATO military planners and civilian policymakers  (who) continue to think in terms of nation-states and “regional areas of operation”. Security, resources and stability will be the likely hallmarks of public concern, not transformation, revolutions and other assorted American policy focuses at this point.

“Maritime operations are of course not foreign to NATO. In the 1990s, Operation Sharp Guard constituted a dress rehearsal of sorts for Operation Active Endeavor after 9/11. In 2003, OAE was expanded functionally and geographically to cover the whole Mediterranean and ended up including some Mediterranean Dialogue countries as well as Russia and Ukraine. Many NATO allies participate in the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and it is no coincidence that the former head of Joint Forces-Naples, Admiral Mullen (the current chief of naval operations and JCS chairman-designate), is the one who developed the concept of the “Thousand Ship Navy” (TSN), which is today the talk of the U.S. Navy.”

Envoking the overlooked spirit of “offshore balancing”, Corn postures that a NATO undergoing a maritime globalization (forged with the lessons of the failure of SEATO, CENTO and other failed alliances) could be an effective 21st Century version of offshore balancing.   It would further allow nations like Sweden, Norway, Greece and Singapore to deploy their effective niche capabilities and play a bigger role in the alliance or in alliance functions, more so than a land-based warfare centerpiece.

“…the TSN concept also represents a revolution in diplomatic affairs, in that a global maritime partnership would go beyond the traditional military-to-military contacts, and, as Admiral Mullen points out, would unite “maritime forces, port operators, commercial shippers, and international, governmental and non-governmental agencies to address mutual concerns.”

Corn closes on the maritime matters with this evaluation of the Thousand Ship Navy concept.  Its a very promising possibility indeed that should be further examined and considered in corporate board rooms, maritime police headquarters and government policy circles for years to come.  A successful harnessing and employment of the concept could yield serious dividends for everyone in the world, especially those who need what it offers most; securing national fisheries, ensuring safe passage for traders and laying the groundwork for the sort of collaborative rescue and recovery efforts that can save lives and perhaps even negate the most negative effects of the worst kind of natural disasters; those which are relatively foreseeable and for which all too often cities and communities are unable to adequately respond to on their own.

Other high points of the essay include the importance of rebuilding ties with Russia, the potential for US responses and outright alternatives to the increasingly hostile UN apparatus,  the non-existence of Israeli public diplomacy and the prospects for the SCO to be a peer competitor or serious rival to NATO.

Honestly

Honestly, I wanted to post something tonight. Then I read about this:

Officials had no sooner announced in February the formation of the Khalil Gibran International Academy than conservative columnists and media outlets attacked, suggesting the principal — an observant Muslim Arab woman — might push an agenda of Islamist extremism.

Principal Debbie Almontaser said her mission was to foster tolerance and understanding. But she resigned Aug. 10 after the New York Post quoted her talking about definitions of the word “intifada.”

Almontaser’s critics say she failed to immediately condemn the slogan “Intifada NYC” on a T-shirt displayed by a group with no connection to the school. She later condemned it.

and this as well.  Thomas PM Barnett’s commentary on this nonsense almost makes me feel better.  Yet no one in power is listening!

To me, this is Bush subordinating U.S. foreign policy to that of Israel and the House of Saud re: Iran, based on an overwrought read of Tehran’s perceived “rise.” We have this tendency to overestimate state-based enemies and underestimate stateless ones–time and time again.

No way to run a war on terror…

Still waiting (more than a month now) on my USF application decision.  Still working with a bunch of gun decking Neanderthals. Now newly allergic to land! (I’ve had odd headaches all day every day since returning to Seattle earlier this week).

I will post tomorrow.  Thanks to Lexington Green for the fantastic book suggestion for my Latin American bloc reading.  Thank you to all those who left kind comments while I was out to sea. They’re most appreciated!