A Realistic Take On China & Burma, Wild Cards Included

Larry Jagan provides a perspective on intra-junta rivalries that augur well for potential mischief by outsiders to exploit.  Friends of Burma would do well to spread the word that the removal of hardliners by moderates would put the new leadership on the fast track to removal of sanctions and substantial international aid, tied to reasonable goals of release of political prisoners and some semblance of represenative government.

Jagan’s portrait of a fluid situtation in the military leadership is joined by Ralph Peters offering a realistic appraisal of China’s long-term interests in Burma informed by his lengthy visit to Burma in 1996 on a counter-drug mission for the US Army.

Peters portrays Burma as integral to China’s security and interests:

“Myanmar offers 1,200 miles of coastline on the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea, bordering the Indian Ocean. And those waters are a strategic lifeline for China, carrying trade westward and bringing back desperately needed oil from the Middle East and Africa.
Myanmar offers the promise of its own oil and gas deposits, while its magnificent hardwood forests are being clear-cut to feed China’s industrial appetites. (The ecological devastation is stunning.) And Beijing sets the terms of trade.

The advent of a pro-Western government in Myanmar would mean that, in wartime, China would have no direct access to the Greater Indian Ocean. The equivalent would be for the United States to lose access to the Caribbean – or worse.”

Given all this, Peters writes there is little America can do to influence Beijing to pressure the junta that would be successful.

Knocking American policy and strategic attention for being focused on one issue: that of the democracy campaign of “The Lady”, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, he captures the horror of misrule and exploitation in one effective sum-up:

“but the undocumented ravages of AIDS up on the Chinese border, the ecological devastation of a unique environment, the junta’s cultural genocide and Beijing’s economic imperialism happen to be a great deal more important than the agenda of the country’s urban intellectuals.”

Considering all the excellent writing on the issue in the past week, I’ve identified several wild cards we have to take into account from here on out.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.  Peters writes: “The only way that Beijing would swing its support behind the pro-democracy movement would be if The Lady cut a back-room deal guaranteeing China’s continued presence, influence and access.”

Junta #2 in command General Maung Aye. According to Larry Jagan, some diplomats and aid workers in country depict him as at odds with the junta leader Than Shwe, leading to curious incidents of military discipline breaking down amid orders to shoot monks and restrict access to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.  Should the two continue to be at an impasse over how to move on in the aftermath of the protests, how willing is Maung Aye to risk his neck in a coup and cut his own deal with the Chinese.  After all a compliant satellite is better for the Chinese than the festering cesspool of failure Burma currently is.

Junta leader Than Shwe. Will he compromise on anything of substance in the aftermath? Will his firm stance render his position of power brittle?  Another article by Richard Ehrlich and Shawn Crispin even suggests in his xenophobic, isolationist worldview, he considers Burma joining ASEAN to be a mistake and is considering withdrawing Burma’s membership. 

Japan.  Anger over the murder of a Japanese journalist and an evolving foreign policy lead Younghusband at Coming Anarchy to ponder Japan’s potential role.  The potential for Japan to make Burma the test case for its more democracy/human rights affirmative worldview is there if Japanese public opinion is spurred by further developments (i.e. some form of confirmation for the (believable) claims of thousands of dead monks and protesters) and Japan could further develop useful ties between ASEAN and Japan for one. 

China.  If Peters is right that China cares more about its long-term presence in Burma than the tainting of its Olympics (a position I tend to agree with) by revelations of terrible slaughter and a worsening situation in Burma, then other avenues need to be explored with China by Western nations.  This brings up a point from Robert Kaplan’s 2006 article about the Kim Family Regime and the post KFR North Korea where it was reported that Beijing had a cadre of well-trained North Korean exiles ready to assume control. 

Building on this last wildcard, why not the same for Burma? 

A future Burma and North Korea with competent leaders who ran satellite states with China-style economies would be better than the disasters the respective populaces are stuck with right now.  Such states are more realistic bets than failed states convulsed by revolution reborn into democracies.  The chances for influence in such states for Western and democratic nations like India and ASEAN would obviously be less, but which wins and losses matter more?