Time For Some Action?

PACOM Admiral Keating said on NPR’s Morning Edition today there was no chance of an invasion to aid Burma’s starving, emaciated survivors of last week’s cyclone.  President Bush and other leaders are currently begging Burma’s military junta

The chattering classes beg to differ:

Anne Applebaum:

Think of it as the true test of the Western humanitarian impulse: The international effort that went into coordinating the tsunami relief effort in late 2004 has to be repeated, but in much harsher, trickier, uglier political circumstances. Yes, we should help the Burmese, even against the will of their irrational leaders. Yes, we should think hard about the right way to do it. And, yes, there isn’t much time to ruminate about any of this.

 
Robert Kaplan:

The magic of this is that an enormous amount of assistance can be provided while maintaining a small footprint on shore, greatly reducing the chances of a clash with the Burmese armed forces while nevertheless dealing a hard political blow to the junta. Concomitantly, drops can be made from directly overhead by the Air Force without the need to militarily occupy any Burmese airports.

In other words, this is militarily doable. The challenge is the politics, both internationally and inside Myanmar. Because one can never assume an operation will go smoothly, it is vital that the United States carry out such a mission only as part of a coalition including France, Australia and other Western powers. Of course, the approval of the United Nations Security Council would be best, but China — the junta’s best friend — would likely veto it.

And yet China — along with India, Thailand and, to a lesser extent, Singapore — has been put in a very uncomfortable diplomatic situation. China and India are invested in port enlargement and energy deals with Myanmar. Thailand’s democratic government has moved closer to the junta for the sake of logging and other business ventures. Singapore, a city-state that must get along with everybody in the region, is suspected of acting as a banker for the Burmese generals. All these countries quietly resent the ineffectual moral absolutes with which the United States, a half a world away, approaches Myanmar. Nonetheless, the disaster represents an opportunity for Washington. By just threatening intervention, the United States puts pressure on Beijing, New Delhi and Bangkok to, in turn, pressure the Burmese generals to open their country to a full-fledged foreign relief effort. We could do a lot of good merely by holding out the possibility of an invasion.

The other challenge we face lies within Myanmar. Because a humanitarian invasion could ultimately lead to the regime’s collapse, we would have to accept significant responsibility for the aftermath. And just as the collapse of the Berlin Wall was not supposed to lead to ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia, and the liberation of Iraq from Saddam Hussein was not supposed to lead to civil war, the fall of the junta would not be meant to lead to the collapse of the Burmese state. But it might.

The credibility of the international human rights regime and the concept of “responsibility to protect” is at an all-time low already. The public manslaughter of hundreds of thousands by xenophobic, paranoid generals clutching to illegitimate power by any means possible while the world does nothing should not surprise.

Yet both are clearly onto something important.  Not only is forceful action possible,  at least the threat of it may be effective as Kaplan shows. 

Public embarassment of China, India and Thailand (the nations with the most investment and influence in Burma) by asking them to do more to pressure the junta may also be useful. 

Above all else, a time frame must be adopted by those nations (America, France, Japan) who seem most interested in forcing the issue with the junta. 

Perhaps a deadline of 7-10 days is merited for wider, more effective permision for NGO’s to operate?

Applebaum and Kaplan both are refreshingly realistic about the problems and challenges such an effort could face.  

Yet in spite of those, its true that a coalition of the willing, backed up by a no-comment from ASEAN and preferably, cooperation from the aforementioned China, India & Thailand, would be preferable to the disgusting spectacle of misery and death sure to define Burma’s summer if matters continue at the junta’s pace.

It may even manage to rehabilitate the concept of “coalition of the willing” for years to come. 

China’s role would be a wild card. Wouldn’t a relatively unfree Burma run and operated by a Chinese-owned junta that was moderately competent and supportive of its people be preferable to the nightmare in power now?

* An alternative concept would be to head to the International Criminal Court and bring crimes against humanity charges against the junta members.  This does not save the endangered lives, but it does get the point across to the junta that their actions will entail consequences.  Pressure Singapore to give up the role of Burma’s banker and go after the personal finances of the junta members by any means necessary.  

The concept of waging personal war against dictators and tyrants is one that should be further explored by governments and interested groups.