“The Ayatollah Begs To Differ” Review

“The Ayatollah Begs To Differ”:

Have the recent events in Iran rendered much of the insight and analysis in Hooman Maid’s journey through Iranian society and political arena? After a second cursory follow through from a first read in May, I don’t think that is the case.

Maid has a pedigree and appearance that seems to have helped open more doors for him than the typical writer about Iran has available, while retaining an affinity with the lower classes and wealthy alike. He’s the grandson of an ayatollah and has the beard of a religious man, though he has close ties to former President and reformer Mohammad Khatami. He is remarkably evenhanded in his approach towards Ahmadinejad, which is beneficial because it fosters a pragmatic appraisal of one of the more important faces of the new Iranian junta post 6/12.

Scattered throughout his peeks into Iranian society are a few fascinating points and arguments worth sharing:

- Ahmadinejad engages in Holocaust denials as a means to humiliate the Europeans by forcing them to admit to their barbarism (“How could such a great civilization do such a thing? Surely you’re not monsters?)and acknowledge their fathers were mass murderers, reminding Iranians and Arabs alike of who the real monsters in history have been. (43)
- After the Shah’s fall, the typical urban gangs were co-opted by clerical backed paramilitary committees (Komiteh). (25)
- The providing of free education to the children of Basiji establishes a powerful relationship between the regime and its violent legions. (29) Also, programs to populate the universities with the poor, the deeply religious and the underprivileged are changing the character of the educated classes (114).
- The more literal interpretation of Shia mythology observed in deeply religious families is a new concept in Iranian history and culture. (85)
- The hardliners introduced into government by Ahmadinejad since 2005 will likely be a fixture long after he has left the scene. (103)
- The question of rights, fundamental to Shia Islam, is explosive in the sense that attempts to deprive Iranians of them (besides alleged token few like clothing choices) can backfire on the regime in power. (118)
- “… the most moderate, and even the most liberal reformist clerics are united in their firm belief that the revolution was pure, that Khomeini’s views on a political system were sound, and that any democracy in Iran will always be an Islamic one.” (158)
- (Before 6/12), The Abu Ghraib scandal, CIA rendition cases, and the Guantanamo detention facility gave Iran, but also its prisoners, an unexpected boost in the years after 9/11 in that Iran, in order to show its moral superiority, continually trumpets the treatment of its prisoners as comparing most favorably to those in American hands. (184)
- Khatami’s failure was to not promote a single successor. (195)
- Shias have long been taught to not provoke their enemies, who in olden days were the Sunni majority surrounding them…. Shia concerns with avoiding conflict that could mean the annihilation of the minority sect(233).
- Iranians are often adroitly reminded by their leaders that when their soon to be deposed prime minister Mossadeq nationalized the Iranian oil industry, in effect demanding their right to the profits from their own oil, the British responded publicly, and at the UN no less, that Iran’s exercise of its right was a “threat to the security of the world,” words that have been repeated by the US in response to Iran exercising its right, haq, as far as Iranians are concerned, to produce nuclear fuel. (235)
- US attempt to pinpoint Iranian machinations behind insurgency foiled by (a) little proof being offered to back up claims and (b) unexploded bombs and shells were displayed with markings, in a perfect English lacking even on unfortunate Iranian road signs (c) dates of manufacture stenciled onto the bombs were not only in English but in the American form (that is month, day, year) rather than in the Iranian (and rest of the world’s) standard format. (236)

All points being debatable, Maid nevertheless leaves the reader with food for thought given potential US approaches towards Iran post 6/12 and how internal events might proceed. The loss of legitimacy by the Ayatollah and the Revolutionary Guard junta that seems to have co-opted other elements into a seizure of power may yet have dramatic negative consequences if the narrative of the reformers begins to appeal to a wider section of society that feels for religious, nationalist and business reasons the regime can no longer enjoy their support. A multi-pronged message will need to be crafted (as it appears is the case) with a patient investment in resources to begin to sour the population on the regime much as Ayatollah Khomeni sapped the strength of the Shah over more than a year.

The book has one notable weakness that should not deflect the reader from at least considering a library check-out:
- it lacks much insight (or giving a voice to) regarding Iranian women, who by most available measures in the post 6/12 world seem to be playing a much greater role in events than previously considered

Post 6/12, this is still a good read on Iranian society and politics.
B+

Merchants And Feudals

Beyond obvious groups of fundamentalists, hardliners and reformers, in nations of keen importance of late there are often those with vested interests in either the status quo or a reversion to older norms.  Their alignment among the forces at work may end up being pivotal for how events unfold.

In Iran, the merchant class has long been a key backer of the clerical regime and their protests against the Shah were integral to his fall. If they perceive their  economic survival could be endangered by a greater engagement with America, their protest would resonate widely. Should they continue to find fault with President Ahmadinejad’s economic policies (such as the attempted tax he imposed in October), they could help engender his downfall. An approach to Iran should take them into account to raise the chances of success.

In Pakistan, as omens of collapse and disorder spread, the response of the feudal lords (who oppose reforms that would better the lives of their tens of thousands of “devotees”) to the violence of Islamist parties and their allies may yet prove decisive in saving or gutting the Pakistani government. Are they being taken into consideration when policies and plans are set forth to help the Pakistani government’s survive?

Similar questions may be asked of how smaller groups and classes with outsized influence and power will choose to act in Mexico, the Philippines and elsewhere, all fashionable (and often for good reason) selections for collapse amid the global financial crisis and mounting insecurity tied to insurgencies, criminal enterprises and external mechinations of enemies.

Notebook 7.2

Russia joins the ranks of the delusional, offering up half-baked diplomatic initiatives and theories of dominance that don’t mesh with reality. Jim Hoagland of the Washington Post has the details. I acknowledge the wisdom of TDAXP’s assessment of Russia when faced with hubris like this.

“Traveling to Berlin early this month on one of his first trips as president, Medvedev stressed the need for “a new world order.” Leaders call for the founding of a new world order only when they are convinced that their nation will dominate it. That was true for George H.W. Bush in 1991, and it is true today for Putin, Medvedev and others in Russia’s reformulated leadership.”

Robert Kaplan continues to thrive writing short posts on the Atlantic Monthly’s Current daily. Here he looks @ Thomas Malthus and his meaning in today’s world.

Nevertheless, if Malthus is wrong, then why is it necessary to prove him wrong again and again, every decade and every century? Perhaps because a fear exists that at some fundamental level, Malthus is right. For the great contribution of this estimable man was to bring nature itself into the argument over politics. Indeed, in an era of global warming, Malthus may prove among the most-relevant philosophers of the Enlightenment.

Fareed Zakaria and Thomas PM Barnett both helpfully pour cold water on the heated rhetoric of fear and exaggeration that dominates America’s understanding of problems like terrorism and Iran’s nuclear program.

Fareed Zakaria

In a sense, the warriors are pessimists. In the old days they were scared that communists would destroy America. Today they rail that Al Qaeda and Iran threaten our way of life. In fact, America is an extremely powerful country, with a unique and extraordinary set of strengths. The only way that position can truly be eroded is by its own actions and overreactions—by unwise and imprudent leadership. A good way to start correcting the errors of the past would be to recognize that we are not at war.

Thomas PM Barnett

As I’ve said repeatedly, terrorism is, to me, what’s left, not what’s next—much less what’s transcendent.

To me, that’s like America in 1875 saying Crazy Horse and threats like him are the future of the United States experiment and we should reshape our entire government and foreign policy and national security establishment to meet this transcendent challenge.

Andrew Sullivan reviews the writings of Bill Kristol, mocking Senator Chuck Hagel in late 2002 for daring to ask what happens after Saddam’s regime would fall, and dismissing with maximum ignorance the possibility of sectarian violence in post-Saddam Iraq. The repugnant Kristol has proven time and again he has the same level of reputability as Tim Donaghy, the disgraced NBA referee, yet is a darling of the media and now enjoys a perch at the New York Times as a resident conservative columnist. There are far, far better conservatives to represent our ideas and opinions than him, and I find it a tad insulting the Times misrepresents us so.