‘The Lucky Ones’

Hollywood may finally have gotten it right. The Army formally supported its production and it looks like it has a good mix of humor, reality and drama. Its in theaters Sept. 26th.

Notebook 7.2

Russia joins the ranks of the delusional, offering up half-baked diplomatic initiatives and theories of dominance that don’t mesh with reality. Jim Hoagland of the Washington Post has the details. I acknowledge the wisdom of TDAXP’s assessment of Russia when faced with hubris like this.

“Traveling to Berlin early this month on one of his first trips as president, Medvedev stressed the need for “a new world order.” Leaders call for the founding of a new world order only when they are convinced that their nation will dominate it. That was true for George H.W. Bush in 1991, and it is true today for Putin, Medvedev and others in Russia’s reformulated leadership.”

Robert Kaplan continues to thrive writing short posts on the Atlantic Monthly’s Current daily. Here he looks @ Thomas Malthus and his meaning in today’s world.

Nevertheless, if Malthus is wrong, then why is it necessary to prove him wrong again and again, every decade and every century? Perhaps because a fear exists that at some fundamental level, Malthus is right. For the great contribution of this estimable man was to bring nature itself into the argument over politics. Indeed, in an era of global warming, Malthus may prove among the most-relevant philosophers of the Enlightenment.

Fareed Zakaria and Thomas PM Barnett both helpfully pour cold water on the heated rhetoric of fear and exaggeration that dominates America’s understanding of problems like terrorism and Iran’s nuclear program.

Fareed Zakaria

In a sense, the warriors are pessimists. In the old days they were scared that communists would destroy America. Today they rail that Al Qaeda and Iran threaten our way of life. In fact, America is an extremely powerful country, with a unique and extraordinary set of strengths. The only way that position can truly be eroded is by its own actions and overreactions—by unwise and imprudent leadership. A good way to start correcting the errors of the past would be to recognize that we are not at war.

Thomas PM Barnett

As I’ve said repeatedly, terrorism is, to me, what’s left, not what’s next—much less what’s transcendent.

To me, that’s like America in 1875 saying Crazy Horse and threats like him are the future of the United States experiment and we should reshape our entire government and foreign policy and national security establishment to meet this transcendent challenge.

Andrew Sullivan reviews the writings of Bill Kristol, mocking Senator Chuck Hagel in late 2002 for daring to ask what happens after Saddam’s regime would fall, and dismissing with maximum ignorance the possibility of sectarian violence in post-Saddam Iraq. The repugnant Kristol has proven time and again he has the same level of reputability as Tim Donaghy, the disgraced NBA referee, yet is a darling of the media and now enjoys a perch at the New York Times as a resident conservative columnist. There are far, far better conservatives to represent our ideas and opinions than him, and I find it a tad insulting the Times misrepresents us so.

Catching Up With Books 6.17

Having recovered the books I left behind in Japan at a friend’s apartment, I have begun to address my anti library.

Jon Lee Anderson’s “The Fall Of Baghdad” is a mildly insightful look at what life in Baghdad was like for the six months or so before the 2003 invasion.  Like many books about Iraq, it focuses too heavily on the big players, in this case, senior government officials and persons of interest in the Baathist regime, including a doctor of Saddam, a notable artist and the propaganda arm of the Baathist regime (the truly interesting part of the story with its conspiratorial alternate reality and Saddam veneration).  Anderson’s best reporting is the brief and weird release of “most” prisoners throughout Iraq by Saddam just months before the invasion, an act that would have chilling repercussions for the horrific crime problem Iraq still is afflicted with even now.

The words of Iraqis and their guests (a jumble of journalists, human shields, humanitarians and foreign jihadists) themselves are what compels the reader forward, from the emergency room doctor who expresses rage at the cluster bombs that leave behind blown apart families to the Swedish humanitarian who admits surprise at how precise and careful the US bombing campaign in Afghanistan was compared to past efforts.  In the end, Anderson gets as close as he safely can to the orgy of looting that engulfs the city before the eyes of passive American troops, a good postscript to a story now being rewritten in a Baghdad soaked with the blood of ethnic cleansing victims but wholly more peaceful (thanks to those same American troops with better leadership and training) than its post-Saddam self over the years.

It earns a C in terms of value and education.

Robert Baer’s “Sleeping With The Devil” is an entertaining peek at the abyss of Saudi royal corruption, American failure in the 80’s & 90’s to address terrorist threats adequately and the disturbing web of questionable ties between all manner of American elites with the Saudi royal family. Clearly the work of an angry former spy, Baer doesn’t mince words but his CIA vetters did, redacting a good 5% of the book, leaving more questions than answers. The corrupt relationship between Washington and Riyadh is explored in stories like that of Boeing, which sold a great number of planes to Saudi Arabia in the 90’s that the country clearly could not pay for, in the interest of American jobs and keeping the Saudis up with appearances. Now that the financial shoe may very well be on the other foot, it would be illuminating to learn what kinds of Faustian bargains American officials and business figures have made with the Saudis (and other oil-producing titans).

What one takes away after reading Baer is a sense that the lobbying process in this country has a serious blind spot for security and the fine line between advocacy and treason, a cascading series of legal and policy loopholes that need to be plugged if America’s best interests are its top priority.

It earns a C- in terms of value and education.

Stephen Kinzer’s “All The Shah’s Men” is a disturbing read that views one of America’s greatest Cold War triumphs through an even-handed lens that casts the real victors as the aaytolahs and terrorists who took power in Iran in 1979. Eh?  While the author reaches too far with that judgment, he gets the details and the story right, identifying the stubborn British refusal to heed the post-colonial reality and compromise on their outlandish oil holdings in Iran as the key cause of the CIA-conducted overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953.  He handles Mossadegh remarkably without kid gloves, casting aside lionizing portraits of him for a full view of a stubborn, tempermental man who felt trapped between the nationalist anger of his people and his own sense of betrayal at the hands of the British (whose culture he nontheless continued to admire) and ended up failing both miserably, playing chicken with the masses and the haughty British, whose irrational belief in their continued superiority was finally wiped out by the Suez misadventure.

The description of the CIA campaign to destablize the Mossadegh government by whipping up rhetoric in newspapers, mosques and city streets, employing often opposing gangs to fight and stir up violence and to discredit Mossadegh in every way makes for exceptional reading.  As much as the “blowback” from the CIA’s successful operation has hurt America, Iran and many others, why should it not be explored as an option against say, Hugo Chavez?

Kinzer places Mossadegh as the first great Third World nationalist after World War II, especially with his performance before the United Nations and in other venues defending Iran’s case and revealing the sickening abuses the British inflicted upon their Iranian oil workers, who would be better described as slaves.  Harry Truman is a tragic figure, trapped between the crackpot British and the stubborn Mossadegh while trying to keep the Soviets at bay and present America as the friend of the disadvantaged and opressed around the world.   The author disagrees with the CIA’s actions, but he relishes a keen eye for every detail in the run-up to and execution of their plot to overthrow Mossadegh and they come across as heroic, cunning champions of anti-communism.

Kinzer whittles down into just under 300 pages what was probably thousands of pages of source material, antecodotes and previous books about the events leading up to the Shah’s installation as ruler of Iran. For anyone seeking to comprehend these events from the British, American and Iranian points of view, he did a job well done.  Highly recommended!

It earns an A- in terms of value and education.