Human Agency And Inevitable Outcomes
Philip Stephens of the FT wrote last week:
“Look back at the past century and most of the good and the bad flowed from the ideas and decisions of political leaders. The same will be true of the coming decades. Bad outcomes, as the NIC concludes, are not inevitable.”
How inevitable was the uncontrollable spread of AIDS in South Africa?
As it contributes to the destabilization of a society already beset by a flailing pseudo-democracy, mounting xenophobia, economic decay and a neighbor on the edge of imploding (Zimbabwe), the AIDS epidemic should be recognized as the leadership fiasco it has been for years. It has been established in Uganda, Thailand and elsewhere that pragmatic, realistic leadership can address the problem effectively.
A recent Harvard study offers data to support this observation, projecting that former South African President Mbeki and his government’s inability to address AIDS has killed 365,000 South Africans prematurely. How many more hundreds of thousands will die prematurely in the next decade?
The human agency is too often overlooked when we analyze or consider why matters are where they currently stand. Without trying to fall into the “great man” trap that opens up with history now and then by ascribing the human agency’s importance as paramount above all else, there are areas where this does seem to have a greater impact than ascribed. When the US considers its allies and their individual importance to our interests, it would be best if we kept this in mind.
The Gloria Arroyos of the world should be shown no loyalty, given that their policies only benefit us in the short term anyway and damage their country for decades to come. The Alvaro Uribes should be rewarded, even at a cost to us in the short term (as in a more beneficial free trade agreement than normally agreed upon) because of what their leadership affords for the long view.
Mugabe, Mbeki & A Devil Of A Situation

A tragedy where little can be done by outsiders begets exceptional commentary regardless.
Morris Szeftel rejects a call for a coup in Zimbabwe by Paul Collier, author of “The Bottom Billion”, identifying the hardliners with Mugabe in the military and political party as a potentially bigger problem than Mugabe himself.
My take: While Mugabe has cultivated a personality cult around himself, I agree with Szeftel that an 80 year old man alone cannot be responsible or perhaps even the primary source of the variety of schemes his regime (and party) have floated to stay in power.
Sometimes we give tyrants too much credit, and the genius of seizing diamond and other mineral rich areas in the Congo during Africa’s “World War” as well as the extensive investments and land provided to business partners and government interests of supportive nations like Libya and China were likely not the product of Mugabe alone.
There are highly vested interests within the military and government (as well as even some businessmen making a tidy profit, though most are opposed to Mugabe and his ilk after they have pilfered the country and destroyed its agricultural base) that would not be keen on sharing power with opponents.
The Strategist takes armchair warriors to task for an utter lack of understanding of Zimbabwe and then offers a more nuanced plan for intervention.
My take: The prospect of any sort of intervention is slim to none, and for reasons identified by Soob below, even the hopes of a South African diplomatic offensive on the matter are unlikely. Dicey are the choices remaining for external opponents of the regime, do they further isolate the regime by the further freezing of assets, travel bans and denial of legitimacy (and could China be convinced to jump abroad this policy?) or can they so overwhelm some within Mugabe’s camp that they jump for a power-sharing deal?
Soob connects the dots and ponders South African President Thabo Mbeki as a realist.
My take: Considering the immense difficulty South Africa is having containing the social, political and security ramifications of the spasm of xenophobic violence against immigrants, Mbeki’s caution is warranted by fear of a further destabilization (and the economic consequences, the violence earlier targeted many immigrants that were essentially “market-dominant” minorities within poor communities, self-destructive behavior that has made the crushing poverty there far worse) caused by fleeing refugees.
Yet, as Ralph Peters points out it, this is ultimately a containment strategy doomed to fail at some point sooner than later. Mugabe will eventually pass on, be killed or be sent into retirement by an ambitious rival. It may be better to risk diplomacy now than hope that the third scenario unfolds rather than the more likely first two. Even Jacob Zuma has condemned Mugabe and called for some degree of power sharing between him and his rivals.
I cannot suggest anything more worth your time regarding this situation than the in country impressions of both Zimbabwe and South Africa Ralph Peters (PDF file here: the-lion-and-the-snake ) made during several weeks in each nation in 2003. Exceptional analysis and firsthand wisdom.
